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Abstract
This paper analyzes how non-voting shares a¤ect the takeover outcome in a
single-bidder model with asymmetric information and private benet extraction.
In equilibrium, the target rms security-voting structure inuences the bidders
participation constraint and in response the shareholdersconditional expectations
about the post-takeover share value. Therefore, the structure can be chosen to
discriminate among bidder types. Typically, the socially optimal structure deviates
from one share - one vote to promote all and only value-increasing bids. As target
shareholders ignore takeover costs, they prefer more takeovers and hence choose a
smaller fraction of voting shares than is socially optimal. In either case, the optimal
fraction of voting shares decreases with the quality of shareholder protection and
increases with the incumbent managers ability. Finally, shareholder returns are
higher when a given takeover probability is implemented by (more) non-voting
shares rather than by (larger) private benets.
We would like to thank Tore Ellingsen, Denis Gromb, Oliver Hart, Linus Kaisajuntti, Anete Pa-
juste and seminar participants at the ESSFM 2006 (Gerzensee) and SIFR/SITE (Stockholm) for helpful
comments and discussions.
yUniversite de Franche-Comté, CRESE. Email: christian.at@uni.fcomte.fr
zStockholm School of Economics, CEPR, ECGI and FMG. Email: mike.burkart@hhs.se
xStockholm School of Economics and SITE. Email: samuel.lee@hhs.se
1
1 Introduction
Dual-class shares in publicly traded rms continue to be controversial. The New York
Stock Exchange used to deny listings to rms with multiple share classes but abandoned
this requirement in 1986. By contrast, the European Commission currently considers a
proposal to mandate the one share - one vote principle, which would ban shares with
di¤erential voting rights and voting restrictions. If adopted, these provisions would a¤ect
a large number of rms: According to a survey commissioned by the Association of British
Insurers, 35 percent of the top 300 European companies deviated in 2005 from the one
share - one vote principle. In the US deviations are less frequent but still common. The
fraction of listed rms with dual-class shares is about 10 percent (Chemmanur and Jiao,
2005).
Proponents of the one share - one vote rule argue that it is most conducive to an
e¢ cient allocation of corporate control. The theoretical foundation of this view is the
analysis of Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988). In their framework,
the security benets and private benets vary across bidders who compete for a dispersely
held rm. Since bidders compete for voting shares, one share - one vote prevents that
bidderswillingness-to-pay for control and their ability to create value diverge, thereby
ensuring an e¢ cient control allocation. By contrast, deviations from one share - one vote
bear the risk that an ine¢ cient bidder with large private benets outbids more e¢ cient
bidders. At the same time, a dual-class share structure may be in the shareholders
interest as it allows to extract more surplus from the winning bidder.
It has to be noted that in this framework the security-voting structure matters for the
control allocation only if the biddersranking according to security benets di¤ers from
their ranking according to private benets. If the most e¢ cient bidder has the largest
security benets and the largest private benets, she wins the bidding contest irrespective
of the security-voting structure. Moreover, the security-voting structure is immaterial for
bid price and shareholder wealth in the absence of (e¤ective) competitors. Due to the
target shareholdersfree-rider behavior (Grossman and Hart, 1980), the bid price must in
this case match the winning bidders security benets. Nonetheless, one share - one vote
is optimal in the sense that no other security-voting structure leads to a more e¢ cient
control allocation in this framework.
The present paper revisits the allocational role of the security-voting structure in a
model with atomistic target shareholders and absent (e¤ective) competition. Instead, it
assumes a single bidder who has private information about her ability to create value.
As a result, the bid price is solely determined by the shareholders free-rider behavior
and must at least equal the expected post-takeover share value. Costly bids are feasible
because the bidder can extract part of the value generated by her as private benets.
Within this framework, we show that one share - one vote maximizes the severity of the
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free-rider problem, thereby deterring too many value-increasing takeovers. Thus, contrary
to the prevailing view, one share - one vote does not ensure an e¢ cient control allocation
and is typically inferior to a dual-class share structure.
In our model, all bidders who make a bid in equilibrium o¤er the same price. While
the equilibrium price is fair, i.e., equal to the average post-takeover share value, some
(overvalued) bidder types pay more and some (undervalued) types pay less than their
true post-takeover share value. In addition, there is a cut-o¤ value, and all and only
types who generate less value are deterred as they would make a loss when o¤ering the
equilibrium price. These types cannot succeed at a lower price since higher valuation
types would mimic them, and shareholders in turn would not tender because the o¤ered
price would be less than the average post-takeover share value. Hence, the presence of
asymmetric information has two e¤ects. First, it causes redistribution among all bidder
types who actually make a bid. Second, it exacerbates the free-rider problem as ceteris
paribus more bids fail than under symmetric information.
The papers novel insight is that the security-voting structure a¤ects the takeover
outcome by altering how shareholders up-date their expectations about the post-takeover
share value conditional on an observed bid price. (More) non-voting shares reduce the
fraction of return rights that bidders purchase and therefore render a bid ceteris paribus
more protable for overvalued types. Hence, some formerly frustrated types can earn a
prot and now make a bid. In response, shareholders revise their beliefs about the post-
takeover share value downward. This in turn lowers the bid price at which shareholders are
willing to tender and makes the takeover protable for further types. That is, deviations
from one share - one vote mitigate in the presence of asymmetric information the free-rider
problem, thereby promoting takeover activity.
The monotone relationship between the fraction of voting shares and the cut-o¤ value
implies that the security-voting structure can be used to discriminate among desirable
and undesirable bids. Unless takeover costs are either too high or too low relative to the
bidders private benets, the socially optimal structure implements the rst-best outcome:
all and only bids with value improvements in excess of the takeover cost succeed. Since
target shareholders abstract from the takeover cost, they have a higher cost of deterring
a bid. Therefore, they choose a lower cut-o¤ value, or equivalently, a higher fraction of
non-voting shares.
Either result can be cast in terms of the incumbent managements quality. When
its quality is lower, the proportion of value-increasing types (for a given distribution) is
larger, and the optimal fraction of voting shares decreases. Intuitively, more non-voting
shares increase ceteris paribus the probability that the incumbent manager is replaced,
which is warranted for less able managers. Conversely, if most bidder types are inferior,
it is optimal to protect the incumbent management from the takeover threat with the
one share - one vote structure. Thus, our model consents with the common perception
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that the merit of the one share - one vote structure is to prevent value-decreasing bids
(Grossman and Hart, 1988).
Another important determinant of the optimal security-voting structure is the bidders
ability to extract private benets. Weak legal shareholder protection (higher extraction
rates), like more non-voting shares, promotes takeovers. Thus, the optimal fraction of
voting shares increases with private benets. This result suggests that the case for the
one share - one vote structure is strongest in countries with weak investor protection.
Finally, we compare shareholder wealth under the optimal security-voting structure
in two regimes with di¤erent extraction rates, both implementing the same takeover
probability. Promoting value-increasing bids by lowering the fraction of voting shares
is cheaper for shareholders than allowing bidders to extract more private benets. The
reason is that extraction is a transfer from shareholders to bidders, whereas the security-
voting structure merely a¤ects the extent of redistribution among bidder types. This
results stands out against the existing literature which advocates private benets (higher
extraction rates) as a means to mitigate the free-rider problem and the one share - one
vote structure as a means to deter value-decreasing bidders (Grossman and Hart, 1980,
1988).
Even though our paper identies new drawbacks of (mandating) the one share - one
vote structure, it does by no means posit that one share - one vote is generally dominated.
Most notably, we consider a setting with asymmetric information and a single bidder. By
contrast, previous work establishing the social optimality of the one share - one vote
structure relies on a competitive setting. Since neither result invalidates the other, the
appropriate conclusion is that the optimal security-voting structure varies considerably
across di¤erent - equally plausible - settings.
Our results depend on two assumptions. First, we assume dispersed ownership of
voting shares. While the results extend to any ownership structure where the majority
of voting rights are dispersely held, they do not hold in case of a blockholder who is
pivotal for the takeover outcome. Therefore, our model cannot address the problem
that dual-class share structures enable owners to control the rm with a minority equity
stake. While many dual-class rms have a controlling owner, dispersely held votes are
by no means unusual. In the sample of Bennedsen and Nielsen (2004) 57 percent of 1035
European dual-class rms have dispersed control, i.e., no group that comprises every
owner with at least 5 percent of the votes holds collectively the majority. For the 500
largest rms, this gure is above 67 percent.1
1Typically, neither ownership studies nor dual-class studies report ownership separately for dual-class
rms. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2004) allow to construct the fraction of dual-class rms which have
dispersed control as dened above. Covering 10 European countries, their dataset merges data from
Faccio and Lang (2002) and self-collected data for Sweden and Denmark. The total number of rms in
their sample is 5162. The numbers of widely-held (total) dual-class rms for each country are: Austria
6 (23), Denmark 14 (70), Finland 29 (47), France 11 (16), Germany 40 (124), Ireland 15 (16), Italy
32 (86), Spain 1 (1), Sweden 59 (185), UK 385 (467). In the sample of Pajuste (2005) the two largest
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Second, the assumed constant extraction rate implies that security benets and private
benets are positively correlated. As a result, shareholders overvalue in equilibrium
bidder types with small private benets and undervalue those with large private benets.
Increasing the fraction of voting shares therefore discourages types with a low propensity
to bid. Yet, this need not be true for alternative correlations. When security benets
and private benets are inversely related, low private benet types are undervalued, and
redistribution among types encourages takeovers. Thus, our results - like others in this
literature - are sensitive to the assumed relationship between security and private benets.
Section 4.3 discusses this issue in more detail.
Several papers analyze takeovers by a single bidder who has private information about
the post-takeover security benets. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the acquisition
of a stake prior to the tender o¤er provides a partial solution to the free-rider problem.
Their (partial) pooling equilibrium anticipates the equilibrium outcome in our benchmark
case with a single share class. The sole di¤erence is that the source of the bidders gains
is private benet extraction rather than toehold acquisition. In a model with two bidder
types, Marquez and Yilmaz (2005) demonstrate that uncertainty about the post-takeover
security benets may make bids protable for the type with high security benets and
low private benets. Neither paper examines the role of the security-voting structure.
Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Chowdry and Jegadeesh (1994) analyze models in
which takeover outcomes are probabilistic and equilibrium o¤ers reveal the bidders type.
Given that the post-takeover security benets become known to the shareholders, the
security-voting structure is immaterial in these models. Each type o¤ers a price equal
to the post-takeover share value, making her gains independent of the fraction of shares
purchased in the tender o¤er.
As discussed above, Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) show that
forcing a would-be acquirer to purchase all return rights ensures an e¢ cient control allo-
cation in a bidding competition but may not maximize shareholder wealth.2 Bergström
et al. (1997) and Cornelli and Felli (2000) revisit these e¤ects in the context of the
mandatory bid rule and the sale of a bankrupt rm. In Burkart et al. (1998), deviations
from one share - one vote can be socially optimal. In the single bidder case, non-voting
shares reduce the fraction of return rights that the bidder has to purchase. This leads to
larger private benets which may be necessary to make the takeover protable. In case
of bidding contests, non-voting shares intensify competition and force the winning bidder
to purchase more return rights, thereby reducing ine¢ cient private benet extraction.
While we also argue that dual-class shares can be optimal, the mechanisms di¤er. In
their model, the fraction of voting shares determines the private benets as opposed to
shareholders own less than 20 percent of the votes in about 24 percent of the dual-class rms.
2Simulations by Sercu and Vinaimont (2006) show that for many distributions of bidder types the
one share - one vote structure does not maximize ex ante shareholder wealth.
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the shareholdersexpectations about the post-takeover security benets. Gromb (1992)
shows in a framework with a nite number of shareholders that non-voting shares mit-
igate the free-rider problem. Reducing the number of voting shares makes each voting
shareholder more pivotal and increases their tendering probability. For the same reason,
super-majority rules increase the takeover probability (Holmström and Nalebu¤, 1992).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and derives the pooling
equilibrium in the simple case with a single share class and value-increasing bidders. Sec-
tion 3 solves the model for a dual-class target and demonstrates that deviations from one
share - one vote mitigate the free-riding problem. Section 4 introduces value-decreasing
bidders and shows that the security-voting structure can be used to screen bidder types.
We derive the socially and the shareholdersoptimal security-voting structure and ex-
amine the comparative static properties of these structures. Concluding remarks are in
Section 6, and the mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a widely held rm that faces a single potential acquirer, henceforth the bidder
B. If the bidder gains control, she can generate revenues V . While the bidder learns her
type prior to making the tender o¤er, target shareholders merely know that the revenues
V are uniformly distributed on

V ; V

.
In addition, the bidder can divert part of the revenues as private benets. The non-
contractible diversion decision is modelled as the bidders choice of  2 0; , such that
security benets (dividends) are X = (1   )V and her private benets are  = V .
Accordingly, the opportunities to extract private benets increase with the generated
revenues, and private benet extraction does not dissipate value, i.e., is e¢ cient.3 Fur-
thermore, the upper bound  2 (0; 1) is commonly known and identical for all bidder
types. The latter assumption will be relaxed in section 4.3 where we allow bidder types
to di¤er in their extraction abilities.
Tender o¤ers are the only admissible mode of takeover, and a successful o¤er requires
that the bidder attracts at least 50 percent of the rms voting rights. To illustrate the
workings of the model, we rst consider the one share - one vote structure and defer the
analysis of dual-class shares to subsequent sections. If the takeover succeeds, the bidder
incurs a xed cost K of administrating the takeover which is independent of her type and
common knowledge.
If the takeover does not materialize, the incumbent manager remains in control. The
incumbent can generate revenues V I which are known to all shareholders. Like the
bidder, she can extract a fraction  2 0;  of the revenues. Hence, shareholders obtain
3Ine¢ cient private benet extraction would not alter the qualitative results, but induce a successful
bidder to acquire as few (voting) shares as necessary to gain control (Burkart et al., 1998).
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XI = (1   )V I in the absence of a takeover. Initially, we restrict attention to value-
increasing bids and set V I = V . The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
In stage 1, the bidder learns her type V and decides whether to make a take-it-or-
leave-it, conditional, unrestricted cash tender o¤er. If she does not make a bid, the game
moves directly to stage 3. If she makes a bid, she o¤ers to purchase all shares for a
total price P , provided that at least 50 percent of the shares (voting rights) are tendered.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the bidder can neither credibly disclose her true
V nor make the o¤er terms contingent on V by e.g. a security-exchange o¤er.4
In stage 2, the target shareholders non-cooperatively decide whether to tender their
shares. Shareholders are homogeneous and atomistic and do not perceive themselves as
pivotal for the tender o¤er outcome.
In stage 3, if at least 50 percent of the shares are tendered, the bidder gains control
and pays the price P and the cost K. Otherwise, the incumbent manager remains in
control. In either case, the controlling party chooses which fraction  of the revenues to
divert as private benets, subject to the constraint   .
Solving the tender o¤er game by backward induction, we begin with the stage 3
diversion decision. Given that private benet extraction entails no deadweight loss, the
optimal revenue allocation is straightforward. Unless a successful bidder has acquired all
shares in the tender o¤er, in which case she is indi¤erent between any  2 0; , she
extracts the upper bound . That is, setting  =  is a successful bidders (weakly)
dominant strategy, and the post-takeover security benets are independent of the size of
the bidders nal stake. If the bid fails or does not materialize, the incumbent manager
chooses likewise the maximum extraction rate  as she owns no equity.
Since shareholders are atomistic, each of them tenders at stage 2 only if the o¤ered
price at least matches the expected security benets. Shareholders condition their expec-
tations on the o¤ered price P , the known takeover cost K and the anticipated extraction
decision  = . Hence, a successful tender o¤er must satisfy the free-rider condition
P  E (XjP;K; ) = (1  )E (V jP;K) .
For simplicity, we assume that shareholders tender if they are indi¤erent. This as-
sumption eliminates mixed strategies and all equilibrium outcomes in which a bid succeeds
and the bidder owns less than all (voting) shares. In addition, it rules out failure as an
equilibrium outcome for bid prices that satisfy the free-rider condition.
4In the present setting, a successful security-exchange o¤er would have to grant all return rights to
the shareholders due to the free-rider behaviour. Otherwise, retaining the initial claim on the revenues
would be a weakly dominant strategy for each shareholder. Thus, a security-exchange o¤er would result
in a complete separation of voting rights and return rights. As this outcome is equivalent to a simple
replacement of management, allowing for security-exchange o¤ers would obviate the need for a takeover
in the rst place.
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At stage 1, the bidder is willing to o¤er at most V  K as a successful o¤er attracts
all shares. Thus, the bidders participation constraint is simply V  K  P .
To avoid trivial outcomes, we impose a joint restriction on takeover cost, maximum
extraction rate and the support of bidder types.
Assumption 1 V < K < V .
These restrictions ensure that some high bidder types but not all low bidder types can
make a protable bid when paying a price equal to their respective post-takeover security
benets. This in turn excludes outcomes where either all or no bidder types make an
o¤er.5
In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the bidder must have correct expectations about
which bid prices are acceptable and prefer the smallest successful o¤er, provided her par-
ticipation constraint is satised. Given shareholders by assumption tender when they are
indi¤erent, this immediately rules out equilibria in which o¤ers succeed at di¤erent prices.
As there can only be a single equilibrium price P

, shareholders infer from observing a
bid that it may come from any type who makes a non-negative prot at that price. Thus,
the shareholdersconditional expectations about the post-takeover security benets are
E (XjP ; K) = (1  )E (V jV  P  +K) :
Given bidder types are uniformly distributed on

V ; V

, a bid is therefore made and
succeeds in equilibrium if the bidders participation constraint
V   P   K (1)
and the free-rider condition
P    1    V + P  +K 2 (2)
hold.
There exists a continuum of prices that satisfy condition (2) and so constitute Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria of the tender o¤er game. Following Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
we select the minimum bid equilibrium which is the unique equilibrium satisfying the
credible beliefs criterion of Grossmann and Perry (1986). All other equilibria require
shareholders to believe that bidders generate, on average, security benets that are smaller
than the o¤ered equilibrium price. (Details of the equilibrium selection are provided in
the Appendix.) Imposing the credible beliefs criterion implies that shareholders do not
5The condition V < K is more restrictive than required to obtain deterrence of some bidder types in
equilibrium. The weaker constraint


 
V + V
   V   V  2 < K is su¢ cient but less intuitive, and
the choice is inconsequential for the results.
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reject a bid consistent with the free-rider condition (2), and that bidders hence choose
the minimum price
P  =
 
1    V + P  +K 2.
Proposition 1 (Minimum bid equilibrium) Given that the target rm has a one
share - one vote structure, only types V 2 [V c; V ] make a bid and o¤er the same price
P  where
V c =
 
1  V + 2K
1 + 
and P  =
 
1    V +K
1 + 
.
Since a bidder can appropriate part of the revenues as private benets, some value-
increasing bids succeed in equilibrium despite the target shareholdersfree-rider behavior.
Nonetheless, all bidder types below the cut-o¤ value V c are frustrated.6 Asymmetric in-
formation aggravates the free-rider problem which becomes most apparent when consid-
ering the bidders participation constraint V > [(P   X) +K]. In a full information
setting, free-riding would imply P  = X, and all bidder types with V > K would
make a successful bid. Under asymmetric information, P  = X holds on average but
not for each individual bidder type. Instead, some types pay more and others less than
their respective post-takeover security benets. The mispricing deters some types whose
private benets are su¢ cient to cover the takeover cost. That is, the cut-o¤ value V c
under asymmetric information exceeds K= (the cut-o¤ value under full information).7
Moreover, bidder types V 2 [K=; V c) cannot succeed with a lower o¤er because all types
V > V c would then make the same o¤er, and target shareholders would on average be
o¤ered less than the post-takeover security benets. Hence, the shareholdersfree-riding
behavior, exacerbated by asymmetric information, prevents some bids, even though they
would be value-increasing.
Corollary 1 The takeover probability decreases with the takeover cost and the variance
of bidder types but increases with private benets.
The ex ante probability of a takeover corresponds to the probability that a bidder type
exceeds the cut-o¤ value V c. Under the uniform distribution, this probability is equal to 
V   V c  V   V . Accordingly, any change in the cut-o¤ value or in the support of
the bidder types a¤ects the takeover probability.
When the takeover cost increases, any bidder who can still break even must on average
generate higher revenues. As a bid signals higher post-takeover security benets, target
shareholders only tender at a higher price. This increases the cut-o¤ value V c, thereby
decreasing the takeover probability.
6In an extension with private benet extraction, Chowdry and Jeegadesh (1994) derive an equilibrium
in which a subset of types also o¤er an uninformative bid price.
7The inequality V c  K= > 0 follows from the condition V > K which must hold for some bids to
succeed in equilibrium (Assumption 1).
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A higher variance reduces the fraction of types above the cut-o¤ value, because the
cut-o¤ value exceeds the unconditional mean
 
V + V

2. In addition, a larger support 
V   V  increases on average the post-takeover security benets generated by those types
who make bid. Accordingly, target shareholders demand a higher price, and the cut-o¤
value increases.
By contrast, larger private benets (-values) not only enable bidders to recoup the
takeover cost more easily but also lower the post-takeover share value. Both e¤ects
induce target shareholders to revise their expectations about the post-takeover share
value downward. This lowers the equilibrium bid price and cut-o¤ value.
3 Non-Voting Shares and Takeover Activity
We now explore the impact of dual-class shares on the takeover outcome. More specif-
ically, the target rm has a fraction s 2 (0; 1] of voting shares entitled to the same
(pro-rata) cash ow rights as the 1   s non-voting shares. Here we treat the fraction
s as a parameter and analyze its optimal choice in the next section. While we assume
dispersed ownership of (voting) shares, the results also hold in the presence of a minority
block, or more precisely, for any ownership structure where the majority of the shares
(voting rights) are held by atomistic shareholders.
The takeover bid and the decision to tender proceed under the same premises as
before. In addition, the tender o¤er may discriminate between share classes but not
within the same class. Thus, the bidder may quote di¤erent prices for voting and non-
voting shares. However, if she submits a price for a certain share class, she has to buy
all tendered shares from that class, conditional upon a control transfer.8
To derive the equilibrium, we initially assume that the bidder only o¤ers to buy voting
shares. As we will show below, this is (part of) the optimal bidding strategy. Since either
all or none of the voting shareholders tender in equilibrium, a bidder has to pay sP to
gain control. Her willingness-to-pay for all voting shares is equal to sX + V  K and
increases with her private benets and the fraction of voting shares. Hence, the bidders
participation constraint is
V   s (P  X)  K. (3)
Upon observing a bid, shareholders infer that the bidder can make a prot when
buying all s voting shares at that price. Consequently, they condition their expectations
about the post-takeover share value on the subset of types for whom the participation
constraint is satised. Given that V is uniformly distributed on [V ; V ], these expectation
8The assumption that a bid has to be unrestricted for a given class is not crucial. Indeed, one can
easily replicate the analysis of intra-class restricted bids by redening s. For example, restricted o¤ers
for half of the voting shares are equivalent to unrestricted o¤ers for all s0 = s=2 voting shares.
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are
E

Xj V   s (P  X)  K = 1  
2
"
V +
sP +K
+ s
 
1  
#
. (4)
In equilibrium, the expectations must at least be matched by the bid price. As before,
we impose the credible beliefs criterion to select the minimum bid equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Given s 2 [0; 1], only types V 2 [V c(s); V ] make a bid sP (s) for the voting
shares where
V c(s) =
s
 
1  V + 2K
2+ s
 
1   and P (s) =
 
+ s
 
1  V +K 
2+ s
 
1    1   .
Lemma 1 replicates Proposition 1 for a target rm with dual-class shares. All types
who make a bid o¤er the same price which is equal to their average post-takeover security
benets. Hence, a given type purchases the s voting shares either at a premium (P (s) >
X) or at a discount (P (s) < X), but the gains of the undervalued types are exactly o¤set
by the losses of the overvalued types. Furthermore, all types V < V c(s) abstain from
bidding because the cost of purchasing overpriced (voting) shares exceeds their private
benets net of the takeover cost.
Since non-voting - like voting - shareholders only tender if the bidder o¤ers at least
the post-takeover security benets, a bidder needs to o¤er the same price to purchase the
non-voting shares. Accordingly, only undervalued types have an incentive to extend the
o¤er P  to non-voting shares. As shareholders are aware of this, they would reject bids
for all shares. Thus, acquiring only voting shares is optimal for all types who make a bid
in equilibrium: Overvalued types limit the loss on the shares purchased in the o¤er, while
undervalued types avoid to reveal that they purchase the voting shares at a discount.
Even though non-voting shareholders are excluded from the o¤er, both classes of share-
holders realize the same expected payo¤. Conditional on a takeover, voting shareholders
receive the bid price in cash, whereas non-voting shareholders retain shares of uncer-
tain value. In equilibrium, the mispricing cancels out on average such that the expected
post-takeover share value equals the cash amount paid to the voting shareholders.9
The comparative-static properties of the minimum bid equilibrium are key to our
subsequent analysis of the optimal security-voting structure. Lemma 1 shows that each
security-voting structure s maps into a unique minimum bid equilibrium. In particu-
lar, the equilibrium price P (s) and cut-o¤ value V c(s) are continuously increasing in
the fraction s of voting shares. This has a straightforward implication for the takeover
probability.
Proposition 2 Non-voting shares promote takeovers.
9This result is specic to the minimum bid equilibrium. In any other Perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
tendering (voting) shareholders receive on average more than the expected post-takeover security benets.
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In equilibrium, the marginal type who makes a bid (V = V c(s)) purchases the voting
shares at a loss that is exactly o¤set by her private benets net of the takeover cost.
A lower fraction of voting shares enables her to earn a positive prot as she has to
purchase fewer overvalued shares. In addition, fewer voting shares render a bid feasible
for some previously deterred types whose participation constraint (3) is now satised.
More generally, any type is now willing to pay more per voting share because her private
benets have to be spread over fewer shares. Hence, a higher fraction of non-voting shares
induces more types to bid, even if the price were to remain unchanged.
Shareholders infer that less exposure to mispricing extends the pool of types making
a bid. They revise their expectations accordingly and are willing to tender at a lower
price.10 This in turn further relaxes the participation constraint (3) of overvalued types
and induces additional types to bid, thereby reinforcing the reduction in the minimum
acceptable bid price.
Thus, as the fraction of voting shares decreases, bidders are willing to pay more but
need to pay less for each voting share. This enlarges the pool of types that can make a
prot and promotes takeover activity.
4 Optimal Security-Voting Structure
To highlight how the security-voting structure a¤ects the tendering decision of poorly in-
formed shareholders, we have abstracted from value-decreasing bids. As has been shown,
a tender o¤er can succeed in equilibrium even though target shareholders incur a loss
(e.g., Bebchuk, 1985). Confronted with a value-decreasing o¤er, dispersed shareholders
face a pressure-to-tender problem: tendering may be individually rational to avoid being
in a less favorable minority position.
Value-decreasing bids are also relevant in the present context. The quality of a
security-voting structure is determined by the extent to which it frustrates value-decreasing
bids but encourages value-increasing bids. To examine both dimensions, we relax our ear-
lier restriction V I = V and let V I 2 V ; V , thereby introducing value-decreasing bidder
types.
The presence of value-decreasing bidder types does, however, not a¤ect our preceding
analysis and results. Indeed, the share value under the incumbent management does
not matter for the takeover outcome. Each shareholder tenders if the o¤ered bid price
matches the conditional expected post-takeover security benets. Similarly, the decision
to make a tender o¤er depends for a given price solely on the bidders type, i.e., her
ability to generate revenues. Hence, Lemma 1 continues to hold for any V I 2 V ; V .
10The derivative of the up-dating function (4) with respect to s is positive if P (s) > (1  )K which
holds in equilibrium. As P (s) > (1 )V c(s), it su¢ ces to show that (1 )V c(s) > (1 )K. Inserting
the explicit expression for V c(s), this inequality becomes V > K which is satisied (Assumption 1).
12
Consequently, success of a value-decreasing bid is an equilibrium outcome in our setting
whenever V I > V > V c(s).
It has to be noted that failure of a conditional tender o¤er - whether value-decreasing
or increasing - can in general be supported as an equilibrium outcome.11 However, our
assumption that indi¤erent shareholders tender eliminates failure as an equilibrium if the
bid satises the free-rider condition. That is, when success and failure of a given bid can
be supported as equilibrium outcomes, we select success even if the bidder is inferior to
the incumbent manager.
Alternatively, one may assume that shareholders reject all bids below the current share
value. This amounts to shareholders playing weakly dominated strategies whenever a bid
is lower than the current share value but higher than the post-takeover security benets.
More broadly, this selection criterion abstracts from coordination problems among dis-
persed shareholders, such as the pressure-to-tender problem, and resulting undesirable
takeover outcomes. But these are precisely the major issues in the literature on optimal
takeover regulation (e.g., Bebchuk and Hart, 2001). Sharing these concerns, we select
success as the equilibrium outcome and analyze how the security-voting structure can
help to overcome coordination problems.
Given our selection criterion, V I a¤ects neither takeover probability nor takeover
outcome. Nonetheless, being the revenues when the takeover fails, V I matters for the
choice of the security-voting structure. To analyze this choice, we assume that the social
planner decides on the fraction s 2 (0; 1] of voting shares, knowing the current share
value, the takeover cost K, the upper bound  and the distribution of bidder types.
Later (section 4.2), we also derive the shareholderspreferred security-voting structure
under the same informational assumptions.
4.1 Social Planners Choice
From a social perspective, the takeover cost is a deadweight loss, while it is immaterial
how the revenues are shared between shareholders and bidder or incumbent manager.
Hence, the expected social welfare is
W = (1  Pr(V > V c))V I + Pr(V > V c) (E [V jV > V c] K) .
Takeovers are socially desirable if they increase revenues by more than the takeover cost.
That is, the socially optimal cut-o¤ value is equal to V I + K. Indeed, inserting the
takeover probability converts the social welfare into
11Given a bid is conditional, a shareholder who believes the bid to fail is indi¤erent between tendering
and retaining. Imposing this belief on all shareholders and breaking the indi¤erence in favour of retaining
supports failure as an equilibrium outcome, irrespective of the o¤ered price (Burkart et al., 2006).
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W = V I +
(V   V c) 
V   V 
Z V
V c
 
V  K   V I 
V   V c dV ,
and the rst-order condition with respect to V c yields
V csoc = V
I +K. (5)
While derived for uniformly distributed bidder types, this result holds for any distri-
butional assumption. Implementing the optimal cut-o¤ value is straightforward in view
of the inverse relationship between s and V c (Lemma 1).
Proposition 3 Each rm has a unique socially optimal fraction of non-voting shares
which decreases with the revenues generated by the incumbent manager.
The revenues generated by a rms incumbent manager plus the takeover cost deter-
mine the unique optimal cut-o¤ value V I +K. Due to the inverse relationship between
s and V c, there is in turn a unique fraction of voting shares that implements this cut-o¤
value (or the closest achievable value). Thus, each rm as dened by its V I has a unique
socially optimal security-voting structure which increases in V I . As long as the opti-
mal security-voting structure includes both voting and non-voting shares (0 < s < 1), it
achieves the rst-best control allocation: It frustrates all and only value-decreasing bids.
This does not hold for the two corner solutions s = 1 and s = 0. If V I is su¢ ciently
high, the one share - one vote structure is constrained optimal in the sense that not all,
though as many as possible, value-decreasing bids are frustrated. Similarly, for su¢ ciently
low V I complete separation of cash ow rights and voting rights does not ensure that all
value-increasing bids succeed. Thus, when one share - one vote or complete separation
are optimal, they only implement the second-best control allocation.
Variations in the optimal fraction of non-voting shares across rms translate into
di¤erent degrees of control contestability. Low values of V I go together with high fractions
of non-voting shares. Such stark deviations from one share - one vote are necessary to
elicit bids from the many bidder types that can generate higher revenues (net of the
takeover cost) than the incumbent manager. In the case of inept incumbent managers
(V I < (1   )K=), complete separation of return rights and voting rights is optimal.12
It minimizes the free-rider problem and is most conducive for a value-increasing takeover.
Conversely, one share - one vote is optimal if the rm is run by a su¢ ciently competent
manager. Since most bidder types are in this case less competent, the optimal takeover
barrier is set high. In all other cases, one share - one vote o¤ers incumbent managers
too much protection from takeovers. Thus, we nd that deviations from one share - one
12As the optimal security-voting structure is derived under the assumption of dispersely held voting
rights, this extreme outcome is not meant to be taken literally. Voting rights without any cash ow
entitlement yield no economic benet to small owners, making dispersed ownership an unlikely outcome.
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vote are in many cases socially optimal. At the same time, our theory concurs with
the argument that one share - one vote is e¤ective in deterring value-decreasing bids
(Grossman and Hart, 1988).
In recent years, many dual-class rms have unied their shares into a single class. In
some cases the abolition of dual-class shares has been an voluntary decision, in others it
has been a response to an anticipated new regulation. Proposition 3 pertains to stock
reunications when undertaken by rms with dispersely held votes.
Corollary 2 Share-class reunications are always in the managersinterest but need not
be socially e¢ cient.
The one share - one vote structure minimizes the threat (probability) of a takeover.
While this is always in the interest of the incumbent manager, it is socially desirable
only if the incumbent manager is of high quality. The abolition of dual-class shares can
have a sizeable entrenchment e¤ect even for an average manager as the following exam-
ple illustrates. Suppose V I is $5M and bidder types are uniformly distributed between
$4M $6M. In addition, let K be $:1M and  = :05. The socially optimal security-voting
structure in this case, s  :36, leads to value-improving takeovers with a probability
of 45 percent. Once the rm unies its shares, the takeover probability is reduced to
19 percent. Or put di¤erently, one share - one vote frustrates about 58 percent of all
potential value-improving takeovers.
Thus, our theory implies that announcements of share-class reunications may lead
to both negative or positive stock price reactions. By contrast, empirical studies on the
abolition of dual-class share structures report signicant positive announcement returns
(e.g., Hauser and Lauterbach, 2004; Dittmann and Ulbricht, 2004.) These studies do,
however, not distinguish between sample rms with dispersed votes and (the majority
of sample) rms with a controlling shareholder. A proper test of our prediction would
require to analyze the subsample of dispersely held rms separately.13
Proposition 3 argues that dispersely held rms should have a dual-class share struc-
ture, unless the incumbent manager is su¢ ciently competent. Importantly, deviations
from one share - one vote promote takeovers only if the bidder can discriminate between
voting and non-voting shares. The requirement to make voting and non-voting share-
holders the same o¤er replicates the one share - one vote structure, which may deter
some value-increasing bids.14 This so-called coattailprovision has the same impact on
takeovers as banning restricted bids for targets with a one share - one vote structure.
Like non-voting shares, restricted bids reduce the fraction of shares that the bidder has
13Interestingly, Dittmann and Ulbricht (2004) nd that the proportion of voting shares not owned by
blockholders has a negative impact on the announcement returns.
14Since 1987 the Toronto Stock Exchange requires any rm which newly issues shares with superior
voting rights to include a provision that obliges would-be acquirers to extend the o¤er at the same terms
to all classes of shares (Allaire, 2006).
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to purchase when gaining control.15 Thus, these rules need not be socially optimal nor
in the target shareholders interest, even though they lead to higher takeover premia.
To fully assess whether these rules are benecial, one would need to observe how many
value-increasing takeovers are being frustrated.
Besides the incumbent managers quality, the takeover cost K and the maximum ex-
traction rate  are further determinants of the socially optimal security-voting structure.
Hence, variations in these parameters also alter the optimal fraction of voting shares.
The size of the takeover cost has two opposite e¤ects on the optimal security-voting
structure. On the one hand, higher costs raise the socially optimal cut-o¤ value, as the
revenues generated by the bidder must exceed current revenues by a larger margin. On
the other hand, higher costs require larger private benets to break even. This deterrence
e¤ect is reinforced by the adjustment of the shareholdersexpectations about the post-
takeover security benets. Therefore, the latter e¤ect dominates and the optimal fraction
of non-voting shares increases with the takeover cost.
Higher extraction rates enable bidders to recoup the takeover costs more easily and
lower the shareholders expectations about post-takeover share value. Hence, higher
extraction rates and non-voting shares are substitutes: Both promote takeovers. As a
result, more voting shares are required to implement a given cut-o¤ value, when other
governance mechanisms put weaker constraints on private benet extraction.
Proposition 4 The optimal fraction of non-voting shares increases in the quality of
shareholder protection.
The result suggests that the rationale for one share - one vote is strongest in countries
with weak shareholder protection whereas deviations may be desirable in environments
where extraction is limited by strong institutions. Furthermore, it weakens the case for
regulatory harmonization across diverse governance systems.
4.2 ShareholdersChoice
As the equilibrium bid price always equals the expected post-takeover share value, voting
and non-voting shareholders have homogeneous preferences. Hence, we can describe their
collective and individual preferences by the aggregate wealth function
 = (1  )V I + (V   V
c) 
V   V 
Z V
V c
(1  )
 
V   V I 
V   V cdV . (6)
Simplifying and deriving the rst-order condition with respect to V c yields
V csh = V
I .
15Note that a mandatory bid rule matters in our model only for the likelihood of a takeover. Conditional
upon a bid, the rule is irrelevant for the division of takeover gains among target shareholders.
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Proposition 5 Target shareholders choose a higher fraction of non-voting shares than
the social planner.
In contrast to the social planner, shareholders do not internalize the takeover cost K
that is privately borne by the bidder. They are only concerned about the security benets.
Since these are proportional to the revenues, shareholders prefer the management that
creates more value, irrespective of the takeover cost. Thus, shareholders prefer a lower
cut-o¤ value than socially optimal and choose an accordingly lower fraction of voting
shares. When a bidder with V 2  V I ; V I +K succeeds, the private benets of the
incumbent manager are not fully compensated by the takeover gains net of takeover
costs.
The privately and socially optimal security-voting structure only coincide when both
are corner solutions, i.e., when either complete separation is privately optimal or one
share - one vote is socially optimal. In all other cases, shareholders would allow too many
takeovers. From this viewpoint, a mandated one share - one vote structure may be seen
as a possibly overshooting correction of ine¢ cient private incentives.
Like the social planner, shareholders have an interest to protect competent managers.
Since they want to admit only bidder types that create more value than the status quo,
their preferred level of control contestability, and hence the optimal fraction of non-voting
shares, decreases in the incumbents ability.16
Given that non-voting shares and extraction rates are substitutes, the question arises
which combination of s and  target shareholders prefer. To this end, we compare
two regimes implementing the same takeover probability. More precisely, consider the
alternatives
n

0
; s0
o
and
n

00
; s00
o
where 0 < 00, s0 < s00 and V cjs0;0 = V cjs00;00.
Proposition 6 For a given takeover probability, shareholder return is higher in the
regime with less extraction and more non-voting shares.
This result reverses the role commonly attributed to the security-voting structure
and private benet extraction (e.g., Grossman and Hart; 1980, 1988). In our setting,
shareholders do not choose a high  to promote takeovers and a high s to frustrate
ine¢ cient bids. Instead, a low  is used to deter undesirable bidders and a low s is used
to encourage the others. The security-voting structure a¤ects the redistribution among
bidder types. More specically, reducing the fraction of voting shares promotes takeovers
by reducing the gains that high bidder types earn from mimicking low bidder types. By
contrast, the extraction rate a¤ects how the takeover surplus is split between shareholders
and bidders. When using  to encourage bids, shareholders bribe bidders out of their own
16The optimal V csh could also be achieved for any s through the coordination of shareholders, i.e., the
appropriate equilibrium selection when success and failure can be supported as equilibrium outcomes.
To support the failure of all bidder types V < V csh requires, however, that shareholders play weakly
dominated strategies.
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pockets. From a social perspective, the regimes are equivalent as they both implement
the same takeover probability and hence the same control allocation.
4.3 Heterogenous Extraction Abilities
So far, we assumed that the security and private benets are positively correlated. In
our view, this is a plausible assumption because it reects circumstances in which private
benets are primarily determined by rm characteristics and the institutional environ-
ment rather than the bidders identity. At the same time we agree that theoretical
reasoning alone does not preclude alternative correlations. As in other models, our op-
timal security-voting structure and its comparative-static properties are sensitive to the
posited relationship between security and private benets.
When security benets and private benets are assumed to be inversely related, non-
voting shares have the opposite e¤ect and discourage takeovers. Suppose that all bidder
types create the same revenues V but di¤er in their extraction abilities , which are
distributed on the unit interval. When the target has a single share class, all types bid
P  =E

1  V = V=2 in equilibrium, provided that the takeover cost is not too large
(V > 2K). Since all shareholders tender in a successful bid, every type enjoys the same
surplus V   P   K. In this equilibrium, no bid is frustrated while all types  < K=V
would fail under symmetric information.
In the setting with negative correlation, the free-rider problem is mitigated rather than
exacerbated by asymmetric information. The pooling price leads to a transfer from high
extraction types to low extraction types, thereby subsidizing those types whose private
benets do not cover the takeover cost.17 More non-voting shares decrease the subsidy
which low extraction types receive and discourage these types. Complete separation
eliminates all subsidies, and - as under full information - only types whose private benets
exceed the takeover cost make a bid. Hence, either one share - one vote or complete
separation are the socially optimal structure, depending on the current revenues V I . For
V > V I +K one share - one vote is optimal. Otherwise, complete separation is optimal
without preventing value-decreasing bids by all types  2 (K=V; 1]. In Grossman and
Hart (1988), one share - one vote is also optimal when security and private benets
are inversely related (across bidders). However, the merit of one share - one vote is the
opposite: Bidders with large private benets face the greatest deterrence. Here, one share
- one vote is the structure with the weakest deterrence.
In the general case where bidder types di¤er both in their ability to generate revenues
and extract private benets, non-voting shares will exhibit both e¤ects: they will encour-
age some bidder types but at the same time deter others. Which e¤ect dominates and, in
17This result suggests that more information about the bidder type may not always be desirable, as
shown in a two-type model by Marquez and Yilmaz (2005). They also briey analyse the positive e¤ect
of supermajority rules on takeover activity. This is equivalent to the e¤ect that voting shares have here.
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particular, which security-voting structure is socially optimal will depend on the extent
of the assumed uncertainty about V and . For convex type spaces, an optimal security-
voting structure will in general not perfectly discriminate between value-increasing and
value-decreasing types. For any optimal cut-o¤ value there will be higher V -types who
are deterred because their extraction rates are too low. Conversely, there will be lower
V -types who bid because they can extract more private benets. While a full analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper, the mechanism identied in the preceding analysis carries
over to any specication. The security-voting structure will a¤ect the takeover outcome
through the same channel: The fraction of voting shares alters the biddersparticipation
constraint and hence shareholdersupdating about the post-takeover security benets.
5 Conclusions
This paper identies a new mechanism by which the security-voting structure matters
for the outcome of a takeover bid in the absence of competition. When the bidder
has private information about her ability to generate value, the fraction of non-voting
shares a¤ects both the bidders participation constraint and the shareholdersconditional
expectations. These interacting e¤ects can be exploited to discriminate between desirable
and undesirable bids. We nd that the one share - one vote rule is in general not socially
optimal.
In accordance with earlier theoretical work, our analysis demonstrates that the optimal
security-voting structure is sensitive to the model assumptions, notably the competitive
environment and the assumed relationship between security benets and private bene-
ts. One challenge for future research is to assess the empirical relevance of the various
mechanisms identied in the literature.
The paper makes several contributions to the recurrent debate about the optimality of
one share - one vote. Most importantly, deviations from one share - one vote can improve
e¢ ciency by promoting value-increasing takeovers. In addition, our analysis casts doubt
on the merits of mandating a uniform security-voting structure across rms or countries.
The reason is that the optimal structure depends on the quality of both the incumbent
manager and the governance mechanisms that constrain managerial self-dealing.
Finally, it has to be emphasized that our analysis applies to widely held rms. In
particular, we do not address the issue that controlling (minority) owners can block a
takeover even if it were e¢ cient. Instead, we point out that one share - one vote can help
to entrench professional managers. Thus, share reunication programs in dispersely held
rms may neither be socially optimal nor in the shareholdersbest interest.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote f (P )    1    V + P +K /2 : As f 0 (P ) =  1   2 2 (0; 1), there exists
a unique xed point P  such that the free-rider condition, P > f (P ), is satised for
any price above P . Thus, any price P+ > P  can be supported as a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium by imposing appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs, e.g., E[V jP ] = V for all
P 6= P+. The pooling equilibrium in which all types bid requires K 6 V   1  E[V ] =
V    1    V   V  2. Assumption 1 (K > V ) rules this out. Existence of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria in which some bids succeed require V > V c  P  + K which is
implied by Assumption 1.
The credible beliefs criterion imposes that target shareholders believe a deviating
(out-of-equilibrium) bid to come only from types that would want the bid to succeed.
For any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with P+ > P , denote the set of types whose
participation constraint is satised for P  by D =

V 2 V ; V  : V  P  +K	 and its
complement by DC . No bidder type in DC would want to bid P  and succeed, whereas
bidder types in D would want to bid and succeed. Consequently, the credible beliefs
criterion imposes that shareholders believe Pr [V 2 DjP = P ] = 1. Given such beliefs
and sequential rationality, shareholders would accept the deviation bid P . Hence, no
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with P+ > P  survives the credible beliefs renement. If
P+ = P , there exists no bid price to which any bidder would like to deviate as any lower
price is rejected. Hence, P+ = P  is the unique Perfect Sequential Equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1
The bidders participation constraint is now sX +  > sP +K which can be written as
V > sP +K
s
 
1  +  .
Shareholdersexpectations about the post-takeover share value conditional upon observ-
ing a bid P are
g (P )  E
"
X
V  sP +K+ s  1  
#
=
 
1   Z V
sP+K
+s(1 )
V
V   sP+K+s(1 )
dV =
1  
2
"
V +
sP +K
+ s
 
1  
#
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The xed point of g (P ) is
P  =
 
+ s
 
1  V +K 
2+ s
 
1    1   ,
and the equilibrium cut-o¤ value V c is
sP +K
s
 
1  + 

P=P 
=
s
 
1  V + 2K
2+ s
 
1   .
Existence and uniqueness are proven as in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
W is continuous in V c. Since
@2W
@ (V c)2
=   1
V   V ,
W is strictly concave in V c. Since V c is a continuous and monotonic function of s, W is
also continuous and strictly concave in s. Moreover, since s 2 [0; 1], it follows that the
problem maxsW (V c (s)) has a unique solution.
By Lemma 1 and equation (5),
V I +K =
s
 
1  V + 2K
2+ s
 
1   .
Solving for s, we get
s =
2
 
V I    1  K 
1    V   V I  K .
Corner solutions are discussed in the text.
Proof of Proposition 4
The partial derivative of s 2 (0; 1) with respect to  is
@s
@
=
2V I 
1  2  V   V I  K > 0 for V > V I +K.
Note that, if V < V I +K, then one share - one vote is optimal because any takeover
would be ine¢ cient.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Let 0 < 00 and choose s0 and s00 such that V cjs0;0 = V cjs00;00 = v, where v 2

V ; V

. By
Lemma 1, v = V c translates into
s =
2v  2K 
1    V   v .
Thus, 0 < 00 implies s0 < s00. Comparing shareholder wealth (6) across the two regimes
and noting that the cut-o¤ value is identical,
(1  0)
"
V I +
Z V
v
 
V   V I 
V   V  dV
#
> (1  00)
"
V I +
Z V
v
 
V   V I 
V   V  dV
#
,
proves the result.
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